burden of proof / keys or plaintext

[Philip Rowlands]

Ross Anderson wrote:
> 
> People like Intel and Microsoft are under much pressure from Hollywood
> to design products that provide ever better support for applications
> which won't provide information `in a form in which it can be taken
> away'. The P3 serial number is the start; if you assume that software
> can be made tamper resistant enough to defeat PC Plod, then P3 already
> lets you write applications which will only display file X on machine
> Y, and only if machine Z is currently online. Future processors that
> have a private key on-chip will raise the bar very much higher,

Surely in this case you would be compelled to surrender your processor on
receipt of a decryption notice - it is the "key" to the encrypted
information. How do you then avoid tipping off your collegues that you
can't reply to the encrypted messages they're sending?


Phil