US Plans for Decryption Orders

[Ben Laurie]

Peter Mitchell wrote:
> 
> Brian Gladman wrote:
> >
> > While this is being publicised as a 'GAK' measure, in fact it is much more
> > sensible than the UK government proposals because it is NOT Government
> > Access to Keys (GAK) but instead required decryption by the keyholder under
> > a court order.  And there is no tipping-off offence.
> >
> > While some will consider this SAFE modification to be oppressive, my own
> > view is that this is not unreasonable provided that there are good legal
> > safeguards.  What I object to is the true GAK that is proposed in the uk
> > bill and the pernicious consequences this has in respect of privacy,
> > criminal prosecution and imprisonment for entirely honnest, law abiding
> > citizens, who it seems, can be imprisoned if they cannot prove that they
> > don't have a key that they have never ever had.
> >
> >
> 
> Brian: I have been puzzled by the correspondence on UK-crypto about the
> decryption order provisions of the draft UK bill. Some people seem to be
> objecting to *any* police access to encrypted documents.

I don't think that's true: the objections have been to access to keys.

> Could you, just very briefly and when you have time, explain how you
> think they represent GAK? Do you just mean that the bill would give the
> police the right to demand that a suspect decrypts any relevant
> documents in his possession? That power (limited by due process etc etc)
> seems essential to me, pace the burden-of-proof issue which is clearly
> unacceptable as it stands.

The bill gives the police the right to demand the decryption keys.

Cheers,

Ben.

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