Crypto elsewhere

[Paul Leyland]

> I suspect that it's shooting itself in the foot early in paragraph
> 3 which suggests that escrowed private keys would be about as 
> much use as... well, read it... )

I did read it.  I conclude that I must be missing something.  Section 3
explicitly states that weak cryptography and escrowed keys are *not*
acceptable:

> 3. Security considerations
> Use of strong cryptographic authentication such as PGP is essential
> for the correct operation of this system.  Compromised cryptographic
> protocols (e.g. using 40 bit keys, or escrowed private keys) would
> *not* be appropriate, since these weaknesses are now well known
> outside the cryptological community - e.g. in the print and
> broadcast media.

My emphasis added.  Am I missing something?

  
Paul