DTI Policy Response

[Roger Fleming]

Stefek Zaba wrote:

[...]
>Umm, not really - it would be bizarre to send a message encrypted in X's
>public key to anyone but X. No, to cause X's public key to be disclosed
>under warranted access - under a reasonable reading of the sketchy policy
>proposals - you cause a message to be sent *to* X apparently *from* a bad
>guy about to get busted. Since "from a bad guy" does not need to be
>cryptographically assured, [snip brief description how]

>It's for this reason that the phrases about "recovery of keys" in Paras
>12 and 14 of the DTI Statement are worryingly vague: warrants which result
>in the disclosure of material allowing a broad range of traffic to be
>decrypted, [...]

This is a worrying train of thought. As it stands, it would seem to be possible
for a dishonest police officer  (or spy, etc) to obtain access to _any one's_
communications, by a similar method.