SPKI's CRC (was Re: New Policy: a Labour Party U-turn)

[Carl Ellison]

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To follow up on my previous message...

SPKI includes the notion that any certificate verifier that happens to have 
access to a signing key can reduce a sub-chain of certificates to the 
5-tuple <self, s, d, a, v> and then sign that as a Certificate Result 
Certificate.  This puts it in the position of signing a key, generating a 
certificate, with no interaction with the keyholder and certainly no access 
to the private key.

Does the proposed UK policy make that mode of operation illegal?

 - Carl

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