Stego file system (Was: Inaccurate study)

[Ross Anderson]

Julian Assange:

> It's a bit unfortunate Ross didn't address this issues in the second
> half of his paper (which was otherwise pretty good)

There's a whole lot more stuff we're working on and which we'll put in
the final version of the paper. Basically it's not enough to have a
steganographic file system; you need a steganographic operating system.

We are not so worried about STM attacks as about what happens if the
authorities get more than one look at the laptop (say at customs when
you enter Burma and again when you leave). The obvious way to deal
with this is to generate cover traffic to the disc; this is easier
with out first hiding method than with our second. Also, you have to
take the same kind of precautions that are needed with a standard
encrypting file system, e.g. to make sure that incriminating plaintext
isn't sitting there in swap space.

Do you have a paper on marutukku anywhere?

Ross